In a recent Rule 23 decision, a panel of the Massachusetts Appeals Court reversed the lower court and held that G. L. c. 208, section 53 (i.e., section 53 of the Alimony Reform Act) does not restrict parties' ability to negotiate and agree upon how alimony is calculated when entering into a separation agreement. (See Pedro v. Pedro).
The Appeals Court addressed this issue in the recent case, Clement v. Owens-Clement. In that case, the Husband and the Wife were married for a total of six years before they divorced in 2013. The parties' separation agreement, which was incorporated into their divorce judgment, included a merged alimony provision in which the parties waived past and present alimony, but presumptively left open the option to seek alimony in the future.
In a recent summary decision, Casey v. Sweeney, a panel of the Massachusetts Appeals Court reaffirmed that a payor's alimony obligation determined prior to the enactment of the Alimony Reform Act in March 2012 cannot be modified without a showing of a material change in circumstances (i.e., a material change affecting either the recipient's need or the payor's ability to pay.
On January 20, 2015, the Supreme Judicial Court issued decisions in three cases involving an important provision of the Massachusetts Alimony Reform Act ("the Act"). In each of these cases, which are described more fully below, the alimony payor wanted to terminate their alimony obligation based upon the Act's language that alimony "shall terminate upon the payor attaining the full retirement age." See G.L. c. 208, § 49(f).