What is the Standard for a Complaint for Modification for Child Custody?
In Erhartic v. Erhartic (Memo and Order Rule 23.0 Decision July 26, 2024), the Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed the Probate and Family Court’s decision to maintain joint legal custody, order the mother to pay child support to the father, and appoint a parenting coordinator.
The parties’ separation agreement, which was incorporated into a judgment of divorce nisi in 2016, provided in relevant part a parenting plan, that the parties share legal custody of their young child, and that no child support would be paid by either party. In 2020, the mother initiated a modification action for sole legal custody, a change to the parenting plan, and an order of child support. After trial, the judge indicated, “I do not find a material and substantial change in circumstances and that it would be in [the child’s] best interests to grant either party’s request for sole legal or sole physical custody.” The trial judge further ordered child support pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines and “that it was ‘imperative’ that the parties continue to work with the parenting coordinator as agreed.” The mother appealed the modification judgment.
The Appeals Court affirmed the decision of the Probate and Family Court to maintain shared legal custody because the circumstances did not meet the standard for a modification. It explained, “the court may make a judgment modifying its earlier judgment as to the care and custody of the minor child [ ] of the parties provided that the court finds that a material and substantial change in the circumstances of the parties has occurred and the judgment of modification is necessary in the best interests of the child [ ].” (quoting M.G.L. ch. 208, § 28). The Appeals Court reasoned that the Trial Court acknowledged the father’s problematic conduct but ultimately found the parties were still capable of jointly making child-related decisions and the child was doing well. The Trial Court “specifically rejected any suggestion that the parties had an inability to communicate or reach decisions in the child’s best interest.”
The Appeals Court also rejected the mother’s argument that the parties could not be compelled to be responsible for the fees of the parenting coordinator. In general, a court cannot require payment for a parenting coordinator over a party’s objection but, in this instance, the court had the parties’ consent. The parties had entered into a stipulation where they “agreed to ‘employ’ the services of a parenting coordinator ‘until such time as the Court issues a final Judgment of Modification in this matter, which does not incorporate the present terms of this Stipulation.’” The stipulation terms were incorporated into the modification judgment.